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Abstract: Recent empirical work finds a negative correlation between product market regulation and 
aggregate employment. We examine the effect of product market regulations on hours worked in a 
benchmark aggregate model of time allocation as well as in a standard dynamic model of entry and exit. 
We find that product market regulations affect time devoted to market work in effectively the same 
fashion that taxes on labor income or consumption do. In particular, if product market regulations are to 
affect aggregate market work in this model, the key driving force is the size of income transfers associated 
with the regulation relative to labor income, and the key propagation mechanism is the labor supply 
elasticity. We show in a two-sector model that industry-level analysis is of little help in assessing the 
aggregate effects of product market regulation. 
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Time devoted to market work diers greatly across OECD economies: total hours of work
per person of working age are currently more than 30% lower in Belgium, France, Germany,
and Italy than they are in the US. A growing literature seeks to understand the causes of
these dierences.1 Any explanation for these dierences must consist of two components:
driving forces and propagation mechanisms. The driving forces are those factors that dier
across these economies, and the propagation mechanism is the economic channels through
which these factors in
uence hours of work. Many driving forces have been suggested in
the literature, including taxes, labor market regulations, and unions. A recent literature has
emerged on the importance of product market regulations for labor market outcomes. Em-
pirical work by Boeri et al (2000), Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), and Lopez-Garcia (2003)
nds a strong negative correlation between product market regulation and employment.
Theoretical work includes contributions by Nickell (1999), Fonseca et al (2001), Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003), Messina (2006), and Ebell and Haefke (2004, 2006).
Interpreting the results of purely empirical analyses can be dicult. On the one hand,
there is always the danger that the results only re
ect a correlation of the variables of interest,
and are not evidence of causation. Second, even if the empirical evidence is taken to imply
a causative relationship, a full understanding requires knowledge of the important economic
mechanism that underlies the causation. But a purely empirical analysis cannot provide
this information. A deeper understanding of how product market regulations potentially
aect labor market outcomes requires a systematic assessment of the channels through which
1Recent examples include Alesina et al (2006), Davis and Henrekssen (2004), Prescott (2004), and Roger-
son (2006, 2008). A related literature seeks to understand dierences in unemployment rates, but these
dierences are almost an order of magnitude smaller in terms of implications for dierences in hours devoted
to market work.
1these regulations aect equilibrium outcomes in various economic environments. This paper
contributes to this eort by examining the eects of one prominent aspect of product market
regulations{increased entry costs{ on labor market outcomes in a simple benchmark model
of aggregate time allocation embedded in a model of entry.
Our analysis generates two important insights about the eect of product market reg-
ulations which take the form of entry barriers. First, from the perspective of in
uencing
time devoted to market work, the key driving force is the size of nonlabor income relative to
labor income that accrue to households as a result of the regulation. Second, the extent to
which this driving force leads to less market work is completely determined by the elasticity
of labor supply. These two insights taken together imply that understanding the eects of
product market regulations on time allocated to market work in this setting is isomorphic to
the problem of understanding the eects of labor income taxes on time allocated to market
work. In both cases the key driving force is the size of transfers relative to labor income,
and the key parameter of the propagation mechanism is the labor supply elasticity.
Two conclusions follow from these results. First, the importance of product market reg-
ulation relative to taxation of labor income is completely dictated by the relative magnitude
of the nonlabor income payments induced by each. Second, entry barriers that consist of
real resource costs have no impact on the volume of market work. Specically, in this case it
does not matter how large the barriers are, since they do not generate any transfer payments
in equilibrium. We emphasize that eects on hours of work are only one dimension through
which entry barriers can aect economic outcomes. Even when entry barriers do not have
any eect on hours of work, they do entail welfare costs by aecting the amount of entry.
We rst establish our results in the context of a simple static model, since this allows
2us to derive the results analytically and best highlights the key economics at work. We
consider a dynamic model of entry and exit that is able to replicate the key stylized facts
about entry and exit. This setting is of interest because it allows for eects on the selection
of rms in operation as well as allowing for positive prot 
ows in steady state. Since we
cannot establish analytical results in this setting, we report the results of policy changes in
a calibrated version of the model. The ndings in this more empirically reasonable model
of rm entry and exit are eectively identical to those in the simpler static model. We also
relate our ndings to those of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) regarding the eect of ring
taxes, and show that a key qualication regarding their results is that they assume that ring
taxes are used to fund a lump-sum transfer payment. When this assumption is removed, say
because the ring tax represents a real resource cost, we nd that ring taxes do not lead to
lower hours, just as is true for the case of entry barriers.
Our results are most related to those obtained in Messina (2006), and suggest that his
analysis overstates the eect of entry barriers on hours of work. He assumes that the entry
barrier is a payment which eectively leads to a transfer payment to consumers. But he
calibrates the size of the entry by using data from Djankov et al (2002), which is based on
measures of time costs. But if one models the entry barrier as a time cost then there are
no transfer payments generated and the impact on hours would be zero. Similarly, Ebell
and Haefke (2006) consider a model with trading frictions, and their quantitative analysis
shows that changes in regulations which re
ect real resource costs have virtually no eect
on unemployment.
An outline of the paper follows. The next section lays out the static model and charac-
terizes how labor taxes and entry barriers aect equilibrium hours worked. Section 3 shows
3that the results in Section 2 continue to hold in several extensions of the simple static model.
Section 4 presents the dynamic model and calibration results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Static Analysis
This section lays out the benchmark static model of monopolistic competition and charac-
terizes the equilibrium allocation for the model. We then analyze the implications for the
eect of taxes and product market regulation on equilibrium hours of work.
2.1 Model and Equilibrium
There is a representative household with preferences dened over consumption of a nal
good (c) and leisure (1   h) given by:






where 0 <  < 1 and 
  0. We adopt this specication of preferences because it is
consistent with balanced growth and permits a parsimonious way of incorporating a range
of labor supply elasticities. All of the results derived below continue to hold in the more
general case of any utility function consistent with balanced growth.
There are two production sectors: an intermediate goods sector and a nal goods sector.
Each point on the positive real line represents a potential intermediate good. Each interme-
diate good i can be produced using a linear technology y(i) = h(i), where h(i) is labor input
for the intermediate good i, but there is a xed cost  > 0 associated with operating any
of these technologies. We assume that the xed cost is in units of labor. For the purposes
4of the decentralization we will also assume that each point on the real line corresponds to a
dierent rm.
The nal goods sector combines the available intermediate goods into the nal good (i.e.,







We assume that the nal goods sector is competitive, and hence for simplicity we assume
that there is a single representative rm in this sector. The representative household owns
all of the rms and hence receives any prots that might accrue in equilibrium.
We study an equilibrium in which the consumer behaves competitively in both the output
and the labor markets and the nal goods rm behaves competitively in both the nal
goods market and the intermediate goods market, while intermediate goods rms behave as
monopolistic competitors in output markets and as perfect competitors in the labor market.
Given the symmetry imposed on the environment, we focus on equilibria in which all active
intermediate goods rms charge the same price and produce the same amount. Given that
we have an unbounded set of potential rms, prots in equilibrium will be zero for any rm
that operates. The equilibrium will only determine the mass of rms that operate and not
the identities of these rms, so without any loss of generality we assume that the rms that
operate lie in an interval with left endpoint equal to 0. We normalize the price of the nal
good to be equal to one and denote the symmetric price of the intermediate goods by p, and
the wage rate by w.
Formally, a symmetric equilibrium for our model is a list c, h, y, N, p, w, d(p),
with the function d(p) denoting the demand function that an intermediate goods producer
5faces for its product. It is easy to characterize the equilibrium for this model, and since
this derivation is useful for the policy exercises conducted in the next section, we sketch it
here. The production function of the nal good producer implies that the demand function
d(p) takes the form d(p) = Bp
1
 1, where B is a constant that depends on the number of
intermediate producers. This demand function in turn implies a simple markup rule for the
equilibrium price of intermediate goods: p = 1
w.
The consumer maximization problem is to choose values of c and h to maximize utility





 = 1; (2.3)
which completely characterizes the equilibrium value of h.
The zero prot condition for an intermediate goods producer is: (p   w)y = w.
Using the fact that p = w=, this implies y =

1 :Given values for h and y,the
feasibility condition determines N as N = h
(y+):Finally, consumption of the nal good is
then computed as c = N1=y:
2.2 Labor Taxes and Market Work
While our objective is to understand the eects of product market regulations on time de-
voted to market work, one of our main results is that the eects of product market regulations
are intimately related to the eects of labor income taxes. It is therefore useful as a rst
step to characterize the eect of a proportional tax  on labor income. A key message from
economic theory is that the eects of this tax depend critically on what is done with the
2Recall that the price of the nal good is normalized to one and that in equilibrium prots will be zero.
6resulting revenue. To illustrate this we contrast two extreme scenarios. In the rst scenario
we assume that the revenue is rebated lump-sum to the representative consumer.3 The
key feature of this scenario is that the resulting transfer serves as a perfect substitute for
private spending. The second scenario assumes that the government uses its revenues to
purchase the nal consumption good, but assumes dierently that the government discards
these goods, or equivalently, uses them to in turn produce something that consumers do not
value.4 The key feature in this case is that the government uses revenues in a manner that
does not aect the marginal utility of private consumption.
Let g denote government purchases of the nal consumption good and let T denote
government lump-sum transfers in units of the consumption good. The household budget
equation is now written as c = wh + T . In scenario one we add the condition T  =
g = wh to the set of equilibrium conditions, while in scenario 2 we add the condition
g = wh but set T  = 0. It is easy to show that the presence of these tax systems do
not aect the form of the demand function for a given intermediate good, implying that
in equilibrium the price charged by intermediate goods producers will continue to satisfy
p = w=. We next derive the implications for equilibrium allocations.
2.2.1 Lump-Sum Transfers
With lump sum transfers, the rst order condition for h is given by:
(1   )w




3In a one good model such as this it does not matter if the teh government transfers purchasing power
or goods.
4Alternatively, it is equivalent to assume that the goods are used to produce a second good that enters
utility additively with respect to utility from c and 1   h. National defense is a good example of this type
of spending.
7Since the government budget constraint requires that T  = wh, this equation reduces to:
(1   )h
(1   h)
 = (1   ) (2.5)
This equation implies that if tax revenues are rebated lump-sum then hours of work are
decreasing in taxes. The magnitude of this eect for a given change in  depends on the
labor supply elasticity parameter 
. While our focus will be on the labor market eects, we
note that the zero prot constraint implies the same value for y as in the no-tax case, i.e.,
y =

1 . Since the feasibility condition is unchanged, N decreases proportionately to the
decrease in h, and c decreases with the decrease in N.








Because the term =(1   ) has the interpretation of the ratio of the transfer to after tax
labor income, this equation tells us that the distortion of h is determined by the extent of
the lump-sum transfer relative to after tax labor income.
2.2.2 Discarded Revenues
If government revenues are discarded rather than returned to the household, the rst order





 = 1 (2.7)
which is identical to the case in which there was no tax. Considering the outcomes for y
and N it is easy to show that y continues to have the same value as in the no-tax case and
8therefore that N will as well. This does not imply that allocations are not aected by taxes
in this case. In particular, given the budget constraint and no change in w and h, it follows
that c is equal to (1   ) of its value in the no-tax case.
2.2.3 Summary
The preceding analysis has a very important implication for assessing the role of labor taxes
in accounting for the large dierences in hours of work across countries, For a given value of
the labor supply parameter 
, what matters is not the dierence in tax rates across countries
but rather the dierence in the amount of income that is being transferred relative to labor
income. Large dierences in tax rates that are not accompanied by large dierences in
transfer payments (whether monetary or in kind) do not generate large dierences in hours
of work. As we will see in the next section, this same message will apply forcefully to the
analysis of how entry barriers aect market work.
2.3 Product Market Regulation and Market Work
Given the simple form of our model we cannot consider a rich class of regulatory policies.
However, the literature that we referred to in the introduction typically focuses on one
particular aspect of regulatory policy, and this is the size of xed costs associated with entry.
Hence, we focus on regulatory policies as they impact on the size of the xed entry cost .
Consistent with the preceding analysis of labor taxes, which shows that the consequences
for labor market outcomes depend very much on what is done with the tax revenue, the
same result will emerge in the analysis of entry barriers. To show this we consider two
dierent kinds of regulatory entry barriers. The rst type of barrier represents real resource
9costs. Examples of this include regulations that require additional resources to be used
up in the entry process, by requiring additional studies, ling additional reports, requiring
more meetings and approval at various levels etc....The second type of regulation involves
purely a nominal cost and does not involve any direct use of resources. An example of this
is when entry requires the purchase of a license. In line with the analysis of tax policies,
in this case we will further distinguish between two cases based on what is done with the
revenues generated by the nominal entry cost payments: are they returned to consumers via
a lump-sum transfer or are they discarded.
In all of the above cases, equilibrium will continue to require that prots are zero. A
fourth case that we consider is one in which the nature of regulation does not lead to zero
prots. In particular, we will consider a policy in which the government controls the number
of rms that operate in equilibrium, possibly by randomly issuing permits, but that there is
no market for these permits. Assuming the number of permits is less than the equilibrium
value of N in the case without permits, then any rm that receives a permit will make
positive prots in equilibrium.
2.3.1 Barriers to Entry I: Real Resource Costs
Assume that the barrier takes the form of a real resource cost, i.e., it represents an increase
in the xed cost , which recall was measured in units of labor. From the expressions derived
earlier to characterize equilibrium we see that an increase in the value of  has no eect on
h, but leads to an increase in y and a decrease in N. Intuitively, higher entry costs lead to
less entry, but in equilibrium rm size increases. While there is no eect on market work,
it is important to note that the decrease in N leads to lower productivity in the nal goods
sector and hence lower consumption and lower welfare. This result is directly relevant for
10evaluating many arguments about the eect of entry barriers on labor market outcomes. In
particular, since most measures of entry barriers, including those in Djankov et al (2002)
re
ect the actual time costs associated with entry the above result is the relevant one, and
it says that while these barriers do aect economic outcomes, they do not aect equilibrium
hours of work.
This result serves to highlight the importance of analyzing the labor market eects of
entry barriers in a model that features the canonical consumption-leisure tradeo in an
empirically plausible form. In particular, if one followed much of the literature and adopted
a specication of preferences in which there are no income eects, i.e., the utility function
is linear in consumption, one would conclude that entry barriers that take the form of real
resource costs do lead to less market work.
2.3.2 Barriers to Entry II: License Fees
Assume now that the barrier takes the form of an entry fee, denoted by , and for convenience
assume that the fee is denominated in units of the wage rate w. This entry fee will generate
government revenues, and completely analogously to the earlier discussion of labor taxes, we
will see that the eect on hours of work depend critically on what is done with the revenue.
We rst consider the case in which the proceeds from this entry fee are thrown away by the
government, i.e., that the government uses the proceeds to purchase the nal consumption
good but then discards it. The household's optimization problem does not change and as a
result the rst order condition for the consumer maximization problem continues to generate





 = 1; (2.8)
implying that there is no eect on hours of work. There is, however, an aect on c and
y. In particular, the zero prot condition now reads (1
w   w)y = w( + );implying
that y =

1 ( + ). It follows that y is increasing in . But since  only represents
a pecuniary cost, the feasibility condition is the same as before, so that N = h
(y+). It
follows that allocations in this case are identical to those obtained in the case where the
entry cost represents a real resource cost. Specically, although product market regulations
in this context do aect allocations and welfare, they do not manifest themselves in changes
in hours of market work.
Next assume that the government rebates the proceeds to the household as a lump-sum
transfer. In this case the household budget constraint becomes c = wh + T where T is the








The size of the transfer is determined by the government budget constraint: T  = wN.
As before, y can be determined solely from the zero-prot condition, and N can then be
determined from the feasibility condition as a function of h. Using the resulting expression




















However, it is perhaps more revealing to instead multiply both sides of equation (2.9) by










Note that the term T=wh represents government transfers as a fraction of total (after tax)
labor income in the economy. It follows that this expression has an identical interpretation
as equation (2.6). It follows that for a given value of 
 , the key value is not the size of entry
barriers but rather the size of the income transfer relative to labor income that is generated
by entry barriers.
2.3.3 Barriers to Entry III: Direct Restriction on Entry
In this subsection we assume that the government directly controls entry through a process of
permits, but there is no charge for a permit. Specically, in order to operate an intermediate
producer must obtain a permit, and we assume that the government restricts the number
of permits to be less than the entry that would occur in a decentralized equilibrium. If
the number of permits is less than the amount of entry in the decentralized equilibrium,
it follows that prots will be positive for any rm that receives a permit. Hence, if it is
costless to apply for a permit, all rms would apply. Government policy can be thought
of as granting permits to a randomly chosen mass of applicants. While we have oered
one possible interpretation, it is worth noting that this policy is similar to some others of
13potential interest. For example, suppose that for some reason (e.g., political connections)
the barriers to entry for some rms are higher than they are for other rms, so that the
barriers keep out potential entrants even though prots are positive for rms that operate.
The permit policy described above is a special case of this policy in which the policy induced
barrier is zero for some rms and innite for other rms.
Let  N be the mass of permits granted by the government, and assume that this number
is binding, in the sense that absent the restriction on permits, additional rms would like
to operate. Denote prots earned by an intermediate producer in equilibrium by . Since
the household owns all of the rms in the economy, these prots will be returned to the
household and the household budget constraint will now be:
c = w
h +  (2.13)
The fact that entry is restricted does not change the slope of the demand function d(p) and
hence does not change the fact that in equilibrium we will have p = w=. Substituting the
budget equation into the consumers objective function, one obtains the following equation







While we could solve for  as a function of the equilibrium value of h and obtain an equation











The message from this expression is exactly the same as from equation (2.12) in the previous
subsection. Specically, this type of policy does have an impact on hours of work, but the
key forcing variable is the magnitude of prots created by the policy relative to total labor
income, and the key factor that determines how this translates into changes in hours is the
labor supply elasticity.
2.3.4 A Restriction on Size
The previous case imposed an exogenous restriction on the number of rms and examined
the implications for the equilibrium size of these rms. It is also of interest to consider what
happens if the nature of the regulation is to restrict the size of rms, but does not change in
any way the cost of entering. In particular, suppose that there is a regulation that requires
h to be less than some value  h. If  h is less than the original equilibrium value h then the
regulation will be binding. The fact that rms face a size constraint implies that equilibrium
value of p=w will not equal 1=. Instead, zero prot will require that:
(p
   w








15But because prots are equal to zero in equilibrium and there are no transfers, it remains






This implies that there is no change in h. Given that there is no change in total hours but
that each rm demands fewer hours, it follows that the number of rms is larger.
2.3.5 Implications for Understanding Dierences in Hours of Work
The previous analysis shows that under some circumstances it is possible for entry barriers
to lead to lower hours worked. A key issue is to determine whether these circumstances
apply, and if so, to assess how large these eects might. As noted earlier, most studies
that document dierences in entry costs refer to real resource costs, and therefore have no
implication for dierences in hours of work. But more generally, considering the cases in
which theory predicts the possibility of labor market eects, the comparison with labor taxes
is extremely useful in providing guidance on at least the relative importance of entry barriers
in accounting for dierences in hours of work. In particular, what we know is that the key
mechanism is the same when thinking about the eects of labor taxes and entry barriers,
and comes down to assessing the eect on income transfers relative to labor income. In the
case of labor taxes, we know the eect is determined by the extent of dierences in transfers
(whether in kind or monetary) that are funded by dierences in labor taxes.5 We know
that dierences in eective taxes on labor across countries are as large as twenty percentage
points, implying that the scope for these dierences to have large eects on transfers relative
5As is well known, since both consumption and labor taxes operate by distorting to the consumption-
leisure tradeo, it is the sum of labor and consumption taxes that are relevant for this assessment.
16to labor income is substantial. In the case of license fees, the eect is bounded by the
importance of these fees as a source of government revenue.6 McDaniel (2008) details the
various categories of government revenues in constructing tax measures, and nds that the
category that would contain this revenue source is of practically no signicance in terms of
generating revenue. It follows that dierences in this category across countries also cannot
be signicant. In the case of direct restrictions on entry (whether implicit or explicit), the
eect is bounded by knowing the extent of the eect on pure economic prots. Denitive
measures of economic prots are somewhat scarce, but the consensus in the literature seems
to be that they are small in industrialized economies, almost certainly less than 5% of total
income. (See, for example, Basu and Fernald (1997) and the references contained therein.)
The key conclusion is that even if the nature of entry barriers is such that hours of market
work decrease, the available evidence suggests that the eects associated with entry barriers
are small relative to those associated with taxes on labor. In view of this we conclude that
it is highly unlikely that product market regulation that takes the form of entry barriers or
size restrictions will be as important as labor taxes in accounting for dierences in hours of
work across countries.
3 Extensions to the Basic Model
In the previous section we examined how product market regulations in
uence equilibrium
hours of work. In this section we show that the results of this analysis carry over to some
more general environments.
6Many authors have produced estimates of dierences in eective average tax rates on labor and con-
sumption across countries. Mendoza et al (1994) is one of the eary examples, but more recent examples
include Prescott (2004) and McDaniel (2008).
173.1 General Preferences
The previous analysis has focused on preferences that are consistent with balanced growth.
While there is good reason to use this condition to discipline preferences in the context of
issues involving aggregate labor supply, it is also of interest to understand how our results
carry over to other specication of preferences. The key point that we want to make in this
section is that the strong link between how labor taxes and entry barriers aect hours of
work continues to hold with more general preferences.
We begin with the analysis of labor income taxes. If we had simply started with a utility
function u(c;1   h), then the expressions that we would have derived for the eect of taxes
would have been:
u2((1   )wh;1   h)
u1((1   )wh;1   h)
= (1   )w (3.1)
in the case where the tax revenues are not returned by a lump-sum transfer, and
u2(wh;1   h)
u1(wh;1   h)
= (1   )w (3.2)
for the case in which revenues are returned via a lump-sum transfer. The dierence between
these expressions and those derived earlier is that the wage rate w now appears. In equi-
librium, wages are an increasing function of N, and since taxes will in
uence N, the wage
rate w will vary in response to tax policies, thereby introducing additional eects. However,
in the rst expression above, it should be noted that the eect on h is determined by the
change in w(1   ) in conjunction with the properties of preferences. In the second case
there are two eects: holding w constant, the increase in  leads to lower hours worked, but
18then there is the additional eect on hours due to the change in w.
Next consider the case of changes to entry barriers. If the entry barrier represents real




where once again, the wage w, will be increasing in N, which is directly aected by the entry
barrier. Comparing this expression to equation (3.1), the key point is that the mechanics are
identical: the equations are of the exact same form, and the driving forces enter in exactly
the same form. One should not conclude that the driving force is larger in the case of taxes,
since the eect on w is larger in the entry barrier case due to the fact that the entry barrier
has a direct eect on N.
If we instead considered the case in which the entry barrier represents a fee that is
transferred to consumers via a lump-sum transfer, then the condition for hours becomes:
u2(wh + T;1   h)
u1(wh + T;1   h)
= w (3.4)
As before, in equilibrium, T is proportional to wh, so that letting this constant of propor-
tionality be equal to b, this can be written as:
u2((1 + b)wh;1   h)
u1((1 + b)wh;1   h)
= w (3.5)
But making the change of variable ~ w = (1 + b)w, and dening (1   ~ ) = 1=(1 + b), this
expression can be rewritten as:
19u2(~ wh;1   h)
u1(~ wh;1   h)
= (1   ~ )~ w (3.6)
Comparing this expression with equation (3.2), one again notes that they take on the same
form.
3.2 Endogenous Markups
In the previous analysis policies that in
uence entry costs do not aect the markup of price
over marginal cost in equilibrium. One might suspect that one of the key channels through
which product market regulations work is to increase markups, and that by virtue of not
having this channel the previous analysis is of limited interest. In this section we show that
adding this channel to the analysis has no impact on the previous results.
The only change that we make to the previous model is in the technology for the nal
goods sector. Specically, rather than letting  be a xed parameter, we assume that  is
an increasing function of the mass of dierent intermediate products that are available, and
write this as (N). The motivation for this extension is the intuitive notion that as more
intermediate goods are produced, the more similar they are, and hence the more substitutable
they become. Formally, this should be modelled explicitly as a property of the commodity
space, and the equilibrium should deal explicitly with the issue of how intermediate rms
decide where to locate in the commodity space. We sidestep this issue here and simply assume
that rms that operate always locate in a symmetric fashion so that all of the intermediate
goods are equally substitutable, and that this substitutability is solely a function of N.
For a given mass N of operating intermediate goods producers, this model behaves just
as the previous model, if we set  = (N). In particular, the nal good producer's demand
20function takes the same form as before and as a result, optimal behavior on the part of the
intermediate goods producers will give p = w=. However, it now follows that any policy
which alters the value of N will necessarily alter the markup in equilibrium, through its
eect on .
Although this extension does have implications for the eects of tax and regulatory
policies on both allocations and welfare, it turns out that it has no impact on how these
policies qualitatively aect the total volume of market work. This can be seen quite readily
from an examination of the household's utility maximization problem. Write the budget
equation as c = wh+I;where we allow for the possibility that the household receives some
form of non-labor income I from the government or some prots from rms. The resulting










In particular, if non-labor income is zero, because either license revenues are discarded,
or because the entry costs represent real costs, then there will be no eect on the volume of
market work. However, we know from the previous analysis that in the case of a regulation
that takes the form of a real resource cost, regulations do lead to less entry and hence a lower
value of N. This lower value of N necessarily implies that there will be higher markups in
equilibrium, but the above expression tells us that when I = 0, the fact that the markup
increases has no implications for the volume of market work in equilibrium. It does not follow
that endogenous markups have no implications for the eect of entry barriers on allocations.





so that if  increases, the reduction in N leads to an opposing eect on y. Since feasibility
requires that N(y + ) = h it follows that a given increase in  will have a smaller eect on
N than in the case where markups were exogenous. Lastly, recall that consumption of the
household is given by c = N1=y so that the endogenous markup will aect the drop in c
associated with a given increase in  due to regulations.
In cases where the regulation leads to non-labor income, either through rebate of license
fees or through higher prots, it remains true that the key impulse is the size of the transfer
relative to labor income and that the key parameter that determines the magnitude of the
eect is the labor supply elasticity 
. In particular, given the volume of the transfer relative to
labor income, from the perspective of what happens to hours of market work it is completely
irrelevant whether the regulation is accompanied by a change in markups.
3.3 Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market
The previous analysis has assumed that labor markets are competitive. Several papers
suggest that the eect of regulation, specically entry barriers, on labor market outcomes
is very much in
uenced by this assumption. In this section we extend the model to allow
for monopolistically competitive behavior in the labor market on the part of workers and
show that the results from the previous analysis continue to hold. This nding should not
be interpreted to suggest that noncompetitive wage setting cannot have interactions with
product market regulation that in
uence time devoted to market work. Rather, the analysis
22should be interpreted as showing that the mere presence of noncompetitive wage setting does
not overturn the previous results.
The extension that we consider seems a natural way to bring noncompetitive wage-setting
into the standard model of time allocation that does not introduce trading frictions, and
follows the approach in Comin and Gertler (2006). Specically, we now assume a continuum
of households with mass equal to one, each with the same preferences as used earlier in the
analysis. What distinguishes the households is that each is endowed with a dierent type of







where h(j) is the input of labor services from household j, and 0 <  < 1 determines the
degree of substitutability of the various labor types. Our previous analysis can be seen as
the special case of  = 1, in which case all labor services are perfect substitutes. Once again
there is a xed cost  associated with operating each intermediate goods technology, but it is
now more convenient to assume that this cost is measured in units of the nal consumption
good rather than labor, since labor is no longer homogeneous.
We consider a decentralized equilibrium in which each household sets the wage rate for
its labor taking as given all other prices in the economy. Each intermediate producer will
behave competitively in the labor market, taking the wages of each labor type as given.
We rst solve for the decentralized equilibrium in the absence of any taxes or regulations,
though in the interest of space we focus on the equilibrium value of h. Because this case is
a relatively straightforward extension of the earlier model we do repeat a formal denition
of equilibrium. We note, however, that a symmetric equilibrium will now involve all of the
23same objects as before, and a new function g(w) that represents the demand for each type of
labor as a function of its own wage holding all other prices equal to their equilibrium values.
Similarly to what happens in the market for intermediate goods, it is easy to show that
this function takes the form Bw
1
 1, where B is a constant. It follows that in equilibrium,
household j will choose c, h and w to maximize:











Substituting into the objective function, taking rst order conditions and rearranging, one





 = : (3.12)
This expression has a natural interpretation in terms of markups. The inverse of the left-
hand side of this equation re
ects the gain to the worker of supplying an extra unit of labor,
and the right hand side says that in the monopolistically competitive equilibrium this value
will be a markup of 1= times its value in the competitive case.
It turns out that the previous analysis of the eects on hours of work goes through
without any change. Specically, all of the previous expressions for hours of work remain
unchanged except for the addition of the term  on the right hand side. It follows that the
24presence of labor market imperfections of the sort considered here has eectively no impact
on how changes in regulation aect market work. In particular, the result that regulations
that increase the real resource costs associated with entry has no eect on time allocated
to market work continues to hold in this model, independently of the value of . The same
holds true for the case of license fees that are thrown away. In the case of license fees that
are rebated, it remains true that the key driving force is the size of the rebates relative to
labor income and the key parameter that dictates how this driving force is transformed in a
change in hours is the labor supply elasticity parameter 
.
The statement that the value of  does not aect how a given change in product market
regulations aect total market work should not be confused with the statement that the
value of  does not aect hours of market work. Our results most denitely imply that
dierences in  do impact on hours of work, so that economies with dierent values of  will
have dierent equilibrium time allocations.
3.4 A Two-Sector Analysis
The framework used for the above analysis is best suited to comparing two economies which
have dierences in product market regulation across all sectors. However, in reality there
are many prominent examples of product market regulations that are sector specic. In this
section we consider the simplest extension of the model to permit an analysis of this issue.
To pursue this we extend the original model to allow for two nal consumption goods. We
now write preferences as:






25where c is now total consumption and h is total time devoted to market work. Total con-
sumption is a CES aggregate of the two nal consumption goods, denoted by c1 and c2:
c = (c
"
1 + (1   )c2)
1=" (3.14)
where " determines the elasticity of substitution between the two goods.
The technology in sector 2 is the same as that considered previously: there is a continuum
of potential intermediate goods that have linear production functions with unit marginal
cost and face the xed set-up cost , and there is a nal goods producer that aggregates the







While we could consider a symmetric structure for the production of the other nal good, for
our purposes it is sucient to consider the simpler structure in which c1 is produced using
only labor with a linear technology. We set the marginal productivity of this technology to
one and assume that there are no xed costs of operation in this sector.
We consider an equilibrium in which the market for labor and the markets for nal goods
are competitive, but assume that the market for intermediates used in production of the c2
is monopolistically competitive as before. Equilibrium for this economy is a straightforward
generalization of that in the previous economies studied, so we do not present the details
here. As before, we focus on symmetric equilibria, in which the prices of all intermediate
goods are the same, denoted by p
y. We normalize the price of c1 to be one, denote the wage
rate by w, and the price of c2 by p
2. Given the linear technology to produce c1, it must be
26that w = 1 in equilibrium. The demand functions for intermediate goods take on the same
form as previously, and hence prices in equilibrium will still be given by the same markup,
p
y = 1
:Finally, given that the nal goods producer of c2 is competitive, prots must equal
zero in equilibrium, implying that p
2N1=y   Np
yy = 0. Using p









Letting  be the multiplier on the budget constraint, the three rst order conditions to
the consumer's problem are: we obtain rst order conditions:
(1   )(1   h)
 











Combining equations (3.17), (3.18) gives:


















" 1 = A(N) (3.21)
27Using equation (3.16) to substitute for p
2 in the budget equation gives:
N
( 1)=c2 = (h   c1): (3.22)











 = 1 (3.24)
which is exactly the same expression as in the one-sector case. Having determined the
equilibrium value of h one can easily solve for the other components of the equilibrium
allocation.
One can now show that the previous analysis continues to carry over to the current
context as well. In particular, if there is a regulation that involves a license fee  to enter





 = 1 (3.25)
where T is the magnitude of the transfer from the government to the representative house-
hold. This gives rise to the same type of expression as derived earlier in the one sector
case.
28An interesting feature of the two-sector analysis is that we can also address how industry
specic regulations aect the sectoral allocation of hours. In this regard, it is of interest to






















This expression gives the fraction of total work that is carried out in sector 1. This
expression is useful in interpreting ndings from industry level studies. In particular, consider
the case of a regulation that increases entry costs in the intermediate goods sector, and
assume that this increase takes the form of real resource outlays, i.e., an increase in the value
of . As was true in the one-good model, our earlier analysis tells us that this regulation
will have no eect on aggregate market work. However, this type of regulation will lead to
a decrease in the mass of intermediate goods rms that operate, and equation (3.27) shows
how this decrease in N will translate into a change in the relative amount of work done in
each of the two sectors. The size of this eect depends on the two elasticity parameters, " and
, but recalling that  satises 0 <  < 1, the sign of the response will be determined by the
sign of ". In particular, if " > 0, then hours of market work in sector 2 will decrease, while if
" < 0, hours of market work in sector 2 will actually increase. The key point however, is that
the change in industry hours is not informative about the eect of this type of regulation on
aggregate hours of work.
There is an alternative interpretation of our two-sector analysis which is also of potential
29interest. Specically, rather than interpreting the two sectors to be two dierent market
sectors, one could interpret sector 1 to be the home sector and sector 2 to be the market
sector. In this case, any movement of hours between the two sectors will show up as changes
in market work even if changes in total work are constant. In the case just discussed in the
previous paragraph, if we assume that home and market goods are relatively good substitutes,
so that " > 0, then a regulation which increases the real resource costs of entry in the
intermediate goods sector will lead to a fall in hours of market work. Of course, this fall
in market work will be accompanied by an osetting increase in the amount of homework.
Recent work on cross-country comparisons of time use (see e.g., Freeman and Schettkat
(2002), Olovsson (2004) and Ragan (2005)) indicate that homework is higher in the countries
of continental Europe, so this channel may be signicant. Of course, as shown in Olovsson
(2004), Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2006, 2007), it is also true that adding home production
in
uences how market hours respond to other driving forces, such as taxes.
4 Dynamic Analysis
In the previous sections we provided analytic results for a static economy with a particular
production structure. In this section we build and calibrate a monopolistic competition
version of the dynamic industry equilibrium model used by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
to study the eects of ring taxes, and use it to assess the steady state eects of entry
barriers. This analysis is of potential interest for three reasons. First, in a dynamic setting,
entry barriers will in
uence both the entry and exit decision, and therefore in
uence the
distribution of rm level productivities via a selection eect. A dynamic model allows us to
evaluate this eect. Second, whereas in a static model the free entry condition implies that
30prots are zero in equilibrium, in a dynamic model the free entry condition only implies that
the expected present value of prots are equal to zero. If interest rates are positive, this does
not imply that the steady state prot 
ow is equal to zero. Changes in steady state prots
induce income eects on labor supply and hence our dynamic model allows us to evaluate this
additional eect. Finally, this analysis allows us to compare the eects of entry barriers and
ring taxes. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) found that ring taxes had somewhat small
but negative eects on hours of work. Since the direct eects of entry barriers and ring
taxes is similar, in that both distort the allocation of labor across establishments, one might
infer that the labor market eects would also be similar. We argue that the Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993) require an important qualication. Consistent with our previous analysis,
we show that the eects of ring taxes on hours of work depend critically on whether the
ring taxes represent a real resource cost as opposed to being a source of revenue that leads
to a lump-sum transfer. While entry barrier and ring taxes that represent real resource
costs do have important eects on allocations and welfare, our quantitative analysis nds
that the eect of these policies on hours of work is eectively zero.
4.1 Model and Calibration





t[log(ct) + (1   )log(1   ht)] (4.1)
where 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor. Note that we have imposed preferences that are
consistent with balanced growth, implying that income and substitution eects are osetting.
The household in endowed with one unit of time each period.
31As in the static analysis, we assume that there are two production sectors, one that
combines intermediate goods into the nal output good, and another that uses labor to
produce intermediate goods. We assume that the nal good sector is competitive with a
constant returns to scale technology, and so for simplicity assume that it consists of a single







where Nt is the mass of intermediate goods rms at time t.
Firms in the intermediate goods sector are subjected to persistent idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks and face two xed costs. As in the static model we assume that there is a xed
labor cost associated with entry, which we denote by he. In order to generate endogenous
exit, we also assume that there is a xed per period operating cost, which is also expressed
in units of labor and is denoted by hf. Consider a rm that produced in period t 1 and had
productivity parameter At 1. At the beginning of period t, this rm must decide whether
to remain in operation or exit. If it chooses to remain in operation it must pay the xed
cost hf. If it pays this cost, it will learn its new productivity, which is described by a den-
sity function f(At;At 1). We assume that a higher value of At 1 leads to a distribution of
At that rst order stochastically dominates the previous distribution. The process for the
idiosyncratic shocks is the same for all intermediate rms, but the realization of the shocks
is iid across rms. If the rm paid the cost hf and received a new draw At it then faces a
linear production technology given by:
yt = Atht (4.3)
32If a rm chooses to not pay the xed cost hf then it exits and ceases to exist.
We also need to specify how the initial productivity for new entrants is set. We assume
that entry occurs in the beginning of the period, prior to any production decisions. Hence, if
a rm pays the entry cost he at the beginning of period t it will be able to produce in period
t and its idiosyncratic productivity will be a random draw from a distribution with density
g(A). All of the xed costs for entrants are captured by he, and so all entrants will produce
for at least one period no matter how low their productivity is. All potential entrants draw
from the same distribution, but the draws are iid across entrants. We assume that each rm
produces a dierent intermediate good, so that the mass of intermediate goods is the same
as the mass of rms. All of the rms (including potential rms) are owned by the household.
We focus on the steady state equilibrium for this model, assuming that intermediate
goods producers behave as monopolistic competitors in the product market, and that all
other markets are competitive. There is an unlimited number of potential entrants into the
intermediate goods sector, so that in equilibrium the net prot from entering must equal
zero. Some notation will help to outline the specics in more detail. Normalize the wage
rate to one and let pc be the equilibrium price of the nal good. Because our intermediate
producers are no longer symmetric there will no longer be a single price for intermediate
goods. We let p(A) denote the price charged by an intermediate producer who has current
productivity A. Given a mass of intermediate goods producers equal to N, the problem
of the nal good producer reduces to a sequence of static problems, and as is standard,
the demand for each input is a constant elasticity demand function with own price elasticity
equal to 1=(1 ) and scale parameter B, i.e., demand is given by Bp1=( 1) for some constant
B. In equilibrium, B will be a function of the mass of rms, N, the outputs of each of the










Let (A) denote the measure of rms in the current period after the xed operating costs have
been paid (i.e., after the exit decision has been taken) the new realizations of productivity
have been realized, and entry has taken place. The mass of intermediate goods producers is
given by N =
R
(A)dA. Recalling that we have normalized the wage to be one, the value
function for a rm at this point in time is given by:
V (A) = max
p;h






subject to taking the demand function for its product as given. Note that the only dynamic
decision involves whether to exit at the beginning of next period. Independently of whether
the rm plans to exit at the beginning of the next period, the optimal decision for price and
labor input are determined by maximizing current period prots, since the operating cost
paid earlier in the period represents a sunk cost at this point. It follows that the optimal
pricing decision will be a markup over marginal cost, so that the equilibrium price for an
intermediate goods rm with current productivity A will be p(A) = 1

w
A. Let h(A) be the
optimal decision rule for labor demand, and let X(A) denote the optimal decision rule for
the exit decision at the beginning of the next period with the convention that X = 1 denotes
exit. Given our assumption that higher A today leads to a distribution of A tomorrow that
is rst order stochastically higher, it is straightforward to show that the function V is weakly
increasing in A and hence that the optimal exit rule will be described by a reservation rule:
34exit if A <  A. For future reference we note that it is also straightforward to show that the
value function V is increasing in the scale parameter B.
Next consider the problem of a potential entrant. The expected value from entering the




If there is entry in the steady state equilibrium then this value must equal zero.7 Since the
value function V is increasing in the scale of demand for intermediate goods, it follows that
the zero prot condition will uniquely pin down the value of B. Given the value of B, one
can solve for the optimal decision rules h(A) and X(A).
There are two remaining equilibrium values to be determined: the level of entry, E, and
the price of the nal good, pc. In general these values need to be solved for jointly, but our
assumption that utility from consumption takes the form of logc implies that the values of
E and pc can be determined sequentially. In particular, the steady state equilibrium level of
entry is determined by the labor market clearing condition. To see this, note rst that the
household labor supply decision in steady state reduces to a static problem of maximizing
current period utility taking the price pc and current prot 
ow, which we denote by , as
given. The choice of logc for the utility function implies that labor supply is independent of
pc so we can write the optimal labor supply choice as HS(). Note that although free entry
implies that the net discounted prot from entry is equal to zero in equilibrium, it does not
follow that the current 
ow of prot is equal to zero, since the interest rate is positive. Given
our preference specication, leisure is a normal good and this function is decreasing in .
7As in the analysis of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), it is possible that there does not exist a steady
state equilibrium with entry. Given that we calibrate the model to be consistent with entry in the steady
state equilibrium, we focus only on this case.
35The labor market clearing condition in steady state equilibrium can be written as:
Z
(h(A) + hf)(A)dA + E(he   hf) = H
s() (4.7)
Note that we multiply E by (he   hf) since we assumed that the xed operating cost is
included in the entry cost. Given decision rules h(A) and X(A), one can easily show that
the resulting invariant distribution (A) is scaled proportionately by E, as is the aggregate
prot 
ow . It follows that this equation uniquely determines steady state entry. Having
determined entry, and given that we know the steady state value of B, it follows that we can
determine the steady state value of pc from equation (4.4).
There are a few properties of the steady state equilibrium that one can infer from the
above constructive argument that are worth noting in terms of the future analysis. First,
changes in taxes will aect the labor supply function HS. But they will not aect the steady
state value of B that emerges from the free entry condition, and hence will not aect the
decision rules h(A) and X(A). It follows that taxes will aect the scale of the steady state
distribution  but not its shape. As a result many statistics will not change, such as average
rm size and the exit rate. While the productivity of intermediate goods producers will not
be aected, there will be an aggregate productivity eect associated with the change in N.
Similarly, in the case of a change in he, the eect on rm decision rules will be independent
of whether the increase represents a real resource cost or is used to fund a transfer payment
to households. It follows that variables such as the entry rate and average rm size will not
be aected by this dierence.
Having laid out the model and qualitatively described some features of the equilibrium,
we will next turn to a quantitative analysis of the eect of product market regulations. To
36do this it is necessary to choose functional forms for the stochastic elements of the model
and to assign parameter values. To facilitate comparison with earlier work, we follow the
choices of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) where possible. Although the values of many of
the parameters are jointly determined, it is useful to describe the calibration procedure as
linking specic parameter values and targets. As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson, we set the
time period equal to ve years. The preference parameter  is chosen so that total hours
of work in the steady state is equal to .3, and the resulting value is .3042. The discount
factor is the ve year equivalent of .96 per year, which equals .80. We assume that the
constant term B in the demand for intermediate goods by the nal good producer is equal
to one in equilibrium. This is equivalent to normalizing the price of the nal good, which
is tantamount to a choice of units. We assume that the idiosyncratic shock process follows
an AR(1) process on log(A), with persistence A and log normal innovations, and that the
distribution for entrants is uniform. As in Hopenahyn and Rogerson, based on data from
the LED we set the persistence parameter equal to .93 and the standard deviation of the
innovations to be .2621. With B normalized to one, the free entry condition determines the
calibrated value of he. The mean of the innovation in
uences the mean productivity, and hf
in
uences the reservation productivity value. These two values are chosen so as to match a
ve year exit rate of .37 and an average rm size of 61.8 For our benchmark specication we
set  = 5=6, implying that markups will be 20% in equilibrium. This value is at the upper
end of what many studies assume, but in terms of the eects on hours of work we found that
8Our model only says how many hours a rm hires. We convert this to workers by assuming that a worker
works 40 hours a week for 52 weeks a year for ve years, and express this relative to the time endowment
which assumes 100 hours per week. Our model is homogeneous of degree one in population, so the number
of rms is linear in the size of the population. While normalizing the population size to be one and having
an average rm size equal to 61 may sound peculiar, it simply implies that we have a small mass of rms
operating in equilibrium. But assuming population of 300 million would have zero eect on all of our reported
results.
37the results are basically the same for smaller values so will only report results for this case.
The one dimension that is aected by the value of  is the size of the aggregate productivity
eects, since the policies that we consider will typically in
uence the mass of rms operating
in the steady state equilibrium, and the magnitude of how this aects aggregate productivity
is very much dependent on .
4.2 Results
We are now ready to evaluate some of the policies examined earlier in the paper in the static
version of the model. But before we do so it is important to note one feature of the steady
state equilibrium. As noted earlier, although free entry implies that the expected present
discounted value of prots for an entrant is equal to zero, it does not follow that the one
period aggregate prots are equal to zero in steady state. Nonetheless, the aggregate one
period prot 
ow is very small, amounting to only 2% of labor income.
We begin by considering the eects of an increase in labor taxes when they are used to
fund a lump-sum transfer. As is standard in this literature, we focus on the comparison of
what happens when taxes are increased from :30 to :50, since this re
ects the typical values
for the US versus countries in continental Europe. Table 1 presents the results, where all
values are values for the high tax economy relative to the lower tax economy.
Table 1
Outcomes for  = :5 Relative to  = :3
H E=N Y=H  N H=N
:76 1:00 :95 :77 :76 1:00
The eect of a twenty percent increase in the tax rate used to fund a lump sum transfer
reduces steady state hours of work by about 1/4. We note that this is eectively the same
38prediction that one would obtain from the static analysis carried out earlier in the paper.
Relative to the static model, and as noted previously, this model has one additional margin
that could in
uence the labor supply response, and that is the eect on prots. Although
the tax and transfer policy has a substantial impact on prots in percentage terms, because
prots are small relative to labor income, the eect of this change on labor supply is very
small. Consistent with earlier comments on the construction of the steady state equilibrium,
taxes have no eect on the entry rate or on average rm size. The large decrease in N
produces substantial eects on productivity, though we note that if markups were 10%
instead of 20%, this eect would be less than one-half as large.
We now turn to an analysis of the eect of entry barriers. We consider the case of an
increase in entry costs he due to license fees, which we denote by . As in the earlier analysis,
we assume that  is measured in units of labor so that the eective entry cost becomes he+.
We then consider two separate cases, depending upon what is done with the revenue that is
raised by the fees.9 Table 2 reports the results for the case in which revenues are discarded.
Once again, all values are relative to the initial steady state.
Table 2
Eects of Entry Fee, Proceeds Discarded
=he H E=N Y=H  N H=N
:20 :999 :96 :99 1:05 :88 1:14
:50 :998 :93 :98 1:10 :73 1:35
1:00 :997 :86 :96 1:16 :61 1:64
3:00 :996 :67 :88 1:30 :39 2:50
9As in the static analysis, the case in which the revenues are discarded is equivalent to the case in which
the higher entry fee represents a real resource cost, so we do not report separate results for the case of an
increase in real resource costs.
39The simple message from this table is that such a policy has virtually no eect on hours
of work. As expected, the policy reduces the entry rate, leading to fewer rms that are
on average larger. Whereas the increase in labor taxes lead to a signicant decrease in the
steady state prot 
ow, an entry fee leads to a signicant increase in this 
ow. But once
again, although this policy produces a sizeable increase in prots in percentage terms, the
change is small relative to labor income and as a result the eect on hours of work is virtually
nonexistent.
Table 3 considers the case where the entry cost is rebated to consumers.
Table 3
Eects of Entry Barrier, Proceeds Rebated
H E=N Y=H  N H=N T=wH
=he = :20 :98 :96 :99 1:03 :86 1:14 :022
=he = :50 :97 :93 :98 1:07 :71 1:35 :047
=he = 1:00 :95 :86 :95 1:11 :57 1:64 :073
=he = 3:00 :92 :67 :87 1:20 :37 2:50 :117
In this case we now see that there is a noticeable eect on hours of work if the change
in entry costs is suciently large. But the key point here is the nal column of the table,
which shows the value of the transfer generated by the entry fees, relative to labor income.
What it shows is that an entry fee that is suciently large so as to fund a transfer payment
equal to more than 10% of labor income would indeed reduce steady state hours of work
by 8%. In fact, this is eectively the same response that one would nd from a labor tax
that lead to a transfer payment equal to this fraction of (after-tax) labor income. That is,
the dierential eect associated with the dierent eects on the steady state prot 
ow is
virtually negligible in terms of its eect on hours of work.
40Next we consider the case where the product market regulation takes the form of restrict-
ing entry, but occurs directly instead of via changes in the entry cost. This case is of interest
quantitatively because one would expect that this is the case that will lead to the largest
increase in prots, and thereby the largest eect on hours of work. Table 4 displays the
results. We use E to denote the level of entry in the benchmark steady state equilibrium.
Table 4
Direct Restriction on Entry
H E=N Y=H  N H=N
E=E = :80 :98 :97 :99 2:52 :81 1:21
E=E = :60 :96 :90 :96 4:03 :64 1:51
E=E = :40 :94 :80 :92 5:56 :47 2:02
The basic pattern of results here is similar to that in the previous table, except that now
the key channel is prots as opposed to the transfer funded by the entry fee. Specically,
one can see from the fourth column that this policy has a dramatic eect on prots. Even
though prots in the initial steady state are very small relative to labor income, the fact
that prots increase more than vefold when entry is reduced by 60% relative to the initial
steady state implies that the eect becomes substantial. By way of comparison we note that
the increase in prots relative to labor income for the case in which E=E = :40 is roughly
10%, and that the eect on hours worked is eectively identical to that which results from
the case in which the entry fee leads to a transfer payment equal to 10% of labor income.
That is, in terms of assessing the eects on hours of work, it is sucient to know the size of
the increase in non-labor income relative to labor income.
For completeness we also consider the eect of a change in . Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) argued that some product market regulations could be understood in a reduced form
41sense as eectively changing  to the extent that product market regulation might impact
on markups, and in equilibrium  is the markup. In their analysis they abstracted from
productivity eects associated with variety, whereas we have not, so we add an additional
qualication up front that the productivity eects associated with a change in  should
probably not be taken seriously if one is interpreting the change in  as being due to a
change in product market regulation whose direct eect is a change on markups. Table 5
shows the results.
Table 5
Eect of Changes in 
H E=N Y=H  N H=N
 = 1=1:15 1:001 1:19 2:24 :89 :64 1:57
 = 1=1:25 :997 :86 :46 1:21 1:40 :71
 = 1=1:3 :993 :67 :22 1:46 2:03 :49
The main result here is that this change has virtually no impact on steady state hours
of work.
4.3 Comparison with Firing Taxes
While the focus of our analysis has been on the eect of product market regulation on hours of
market work, it is of interest to compare the results that we obtain here with those obtained
by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) in their analysis of ring taxes. In particular, they report
that a ring tax equal to one year's wage leads to a reduction in hours of work of roughly 2.5%.
At rst glance one might conclude that ring taxes have larger eects on hours of work than
do entry barriers. However, a closer analysis reveals that this conclusion is not warranted. In
particular, one of the key messages of the analysis that we have undertaken above is that the
42eects of entry barriers on hours of market work depends critically on what is done with the
revenue that is generated from the regulation, or more specically, on the size of the eect
of the regulation on income transfers relative to labor income. Hopenhayn and Rogerson
assumed that the revenue from the ring taxes was used to fund a lump-sum transfer to all
households. In light of the preceding analysis, we think it is interesting to ask to what extent
the Hopenhayn and Rogerson results are aected by changing the assumption regarding the
nature of the ring taxes. We note that both interpretations of the ring tax are reasonable,
in the sense that one interpretation of the tax is that it re
ects additional resources that a
rm must expend in order to reduce the size of its payroll, either by hiring lawyers, meeting
with government ocials, preparing reports to justify the reduction in workforce etc... The
other interpretation is that it re
ects a lump-sum payment to workers. In this case it is
critical that it re
ect a lump-sum payment and not deferred compensation. We carry out
an analysis of ring taxes in the context of our calibrated model, which diers slightly from
Hopenhayn and Rogerson because of the assumption of dierentiated intermediate goods
and monopolistic competition in the intermediate good sector. Table 6 reports the results.
Table 6
Eect of Firing Tax of 1 Year's Wage
H E=N Y=H  N H=N
Rebated :96 :90 :98 :26 :86 :90
Not-Rebated 1:01 :90 :99 :28 :91 :90
If one compares the results in the rst row with those in Hopenhayn and Rogerson, one
sees that the presence of monopolistic competition and the intermediate goods sector does
alter the precise quantitative eects, though not the general nature of their results.10 In
10In Hopenhayn and Rogerson, the key curvature aecting rm level demand for labor comes from the
assumption of decreasing returns to scale in production, whereas in the analysis here, the key curvature
43particular, we nd that productivity decreases by 2% and hours worked decrease by 4%, in
contrast to values of 2.1% and 2.5% in Hopenhayn and Rogerson. But the key point is that
when we look at the case where the revenues are not rebated, the results for productivity
are similar (reducing by 1% instead of 2%), but the change in hours is now of a dierent
sign: an increase of 1% versus a decrease of 4%. The reason for the increase in hours is that
ring taxes lead to a signicantly lower steady state prot 
ow. However, as was the case
in the analysis of entry barriers, because prots are small relative to labor income, even a
large percentage change in prots leads to a relatively small eect on hours of work.
4.4 Summary
The main result that we want to emphasize from the above simulations is that the results
from our static analysis continue to hold in a dynamic model with ore realistic processes
for rm level dynamics, particularly for the processes of entry and exit. While the dynamic
models do feature some additional eects relative to those in the static model, these eects
turn out to be very small in our calibrated model. We also show that the results of Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993) need to be interpreted with caution, since the same basic point applies
equally well to the analysis of labor market regulations such as ring taxes. That is, the
key mechanism that leads to changes in hours worked in their model is changes in non-labor
income associated with the revenues from the ring taxes.
comes from the substitutability among intermediates. The calibrations imply dierent degrees of curvature
and hence the eects of ring taxes dier somewhat.
445 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to assess the eect of product market regulations which take
the form of increased entry costs on time allocated to market work in the context of a
standard aggregate model of time allocation. Several results have emerged. The eect of
product market regulation on time allocated to market work can be understood in exactly
the same way as the eect of labor or consumption taxes on the time allocated to market
work. The key driving force in both cases is the implicit transfer of resources to households
as a fraction of total labor income, and the key feature of the model that in
uences the
propagation of this driving force is the labor supply elasticity. A direct implication of this is
that regulations which increase the real resource costs associated with entry have no impact
on time devoted to market work given standard assumptions about preferences. Measures of
the dierences in the magnitude of entry barriers associated with regulation are by themselves
not very informative about the impact of regulations on market work, since large dierences
in regulatory barriers may be associated with small dierences in eective transfer payments.
Our results were robust to allowing for endogenous markups, a particular form of imperfect
competition in the labor market, and to having multiple nal goods. The multi-sector model
also indicates that analysis of outcomes in individual sectors are unlikely to yield information
regarding the eect of labor market regulation on total market work. Taken at face value,
our results indicate that stories which stress product market regulation rather than taxes as
a key driving force face a key challenge. Since the propagation mechanisms are identical,
the relative importance of the two is determined by the relative importance of the implied
transfer payments. We are aware of no evidence that suggests that dierences in implicit
transfers or economic prots associated with product market regulation are comparable to
45the dierences in revenues associated with either labor or consumption taxation.
Our analysis of a two sector model does suggest one channel which seems promising for
future research. If product market regulation leads to higher prices of market produced goods
and services, then they encourage individuals to substitute from market produced services
to home produced services when good nonmarket substitutes are available. This suggests
that future work should focus on identifying product market regulations in those sectors for
which good nonmarket substitutes do exist and examine the patterns of market work and
time spent in home production in these categories of goods. This would complement the
analysis of Davis and Henrekson (2004), who carried out such an exercise for the eect of
taxes on various market activities.
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